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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Abraham Vargas appeals from the jury verdict finding him guilty of grand 
theft. Vargas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the district court's 
rejection of his proposed jury instruction on salvage value. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On each of two days, March 20 and March 22, Vargas delivered a load of 
irrigation well pipe (also referred to during trial as "well casing" and "oil tube and 
shaft") to Santos Metals and Recycling as scrap and was paid the salvage value 
of the pipe. (Tr., p.41, Ls.8-10; p.45, L.4-p.46, L.5; p.85, L.19-p.87, L.5; p.89, 
Ls.9-13.) When it was discovered that the pipe was stolen, Vargas was charged 
with grand theft by possession of stolen property. (R., pp.52-53.) 
The jury found Vargas guilty of grand theft. (R., pp.150, 152.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of three years with one year 
fixed, suspended the sentence and placed Vargas on probation. (R., pp.168-
169.) Vargas timely appealed. (R., pp.176-179.) 
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ISSUES 
Vargas states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the State provide sufficient evidence that the Defendant, 
Abraham Vargas, knowingly received, retained, concealed, 
obtained control over, possessed, or disposed of stolen 
property worth more than $1,000.00 pursuant to Idaho 
Statutes§§ 18-2403(4) and 18-2407(1)? 
2. Did the State provide sufficient evidence of market value for 
the used pipes pursuant to Idaho Statute § 18-2407(1) and 
State of Idaho v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259 (Ct. App. 2010)7 
3. Did the State provide sufficient evidence of the replacement 
value of the old, rusty and possibly radioactive pipe pursuant 
to Idaho Statute § 18-2407(1) and State v. Hughes, 130 
Idaho 698 (Ct. App. 1997)? 
4. Did the district Court err in denying Abraham Vargas's 
Motion to submit jury instructions regarding salvage value? 
(Appellant's brief, p.7.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was there substantial evidence presented at trial from which the jury 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Vargas was guilty of grand theft by 
possession of stolen property? 
2. Has Vargas failed to show that the district court erred when it refused his 
jury instruction? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
There Was Substantial Evidence Presented At Trial From Which The Jury Found 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Vargas Was Guilty Of Grand Theft By 
Possession Of Stolen Property 
A. Introduction 
Vargas argues that the state failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to 
establish that the value of the stolen pipe proven to be possessed by Vargas 
exceeded $1000. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-14.) A review of the record and the 
applicable law shows that the state presented substantial evidence at trial from 
which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the stolen pipe 
possessed by Vargas exceeded $1000, and, as such, Vargas was guilty of grand 
theft. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A jury verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial 
evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found that the prosecution 
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 
1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). 
In conducting this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of 
the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, 
or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 
121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d 
at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
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construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 
P.2d at 1072. 
C. The Evidence Presented To The Jury 
Eric Staley owns an irrigation pump company, GJ Verti-Line Pumps, which 
installs and repairs deep well turbine pumps for the agricultural community. (Tr., 
p. 41, Ls.8-14.) His crew pulled out a pump "so well work could be done on it" at 
a farm in Cassia County, Oakley Idaho Crops. (Tr., p.42, Ls.2-20.) This involved 
laying the pipe on ties or pallets, in order, "so that when they go back in [they] go 
in in the same order that they were pulled." (Tr., p.70, Ls.15-22.) The crew 
began re-installing the pump on a Friday, stopped work for the weekend, and 
returned on Monday morning to find "a bunch of the tubing shaft for the pump ... 
was missing." (Tr., p.42, Ls.17-24.) In all, 19 of the 10-foot tube and shaft 
sections and two 10-inch column pipes were missing. (Tr., p.48, Ls.1-3; p.70, 
Ls.9-14.) Mr. Staley immediately called Kaye Young, the manager of Oakley 
Idaho Crops. (Tr., p.42, L.25 - p.43, L.6.) Mr. Young contacted law 
enforcement and thereafter personally went to two recycling places, including 
Santos Recycling, to see if the stolen pipe had been sold for scrap. (Tr., p.65, 
L.17 - p.66, L.25.) 
Manuel Santos, owner of Santos Recycling, knew immediately what pipe 
Mr. Kaye was looking for, testifying that his business doesn't "get much of that" 
kind of pipe. (Tr., p.87, Ls.13-19.) Mr. Santos testified that Vargas had recently 
brought in the pipe, or "well casing," in two loads, each delivered on separate 
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days. (Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.87, L.5.) Santos also testified that Vargas was by 
himself when he delivered one of the loads, and had "somebody else with him" 
when he delivered the other load. (Tr., p.86, Ls.18-24.) 
Mr. Santos showed the pipe to Mr. Kaye, who "immediately recognized 
that it was his." (Tr., p.87, Ls.18-19.) Mr. Kaye recognized it as the pipe that 
had been taken from his farm, because it was 10-foot lengths of pipe, and each 
pipe had been prepared for re-use: each was still wrapped at one end to protect 
the exterior threads on the pipe and had a rubber stopper in the other to protect 
the interior threads. (Tr., p.67, L.12 - p.68, L.14.) When Mr. Kaye called Mr. 
Staley to tell him he had found the pipe, Mr. Staley's crew picked up the pipe 
from Santos Recycling, "hauled it back out and started installing it." 
(Tr., p.49, Ls.17-22; p.54, Ls.11-21; p.68, Ls.3-6; p.69, L.20 - p. 70, L.9.) As of 
the date of the trial, the pipe was "back in the hole working right now." (Tr., p.49, 
Ls.17-22.) 
Mr. Staley, the owner of GJ Verti-Line Pumps for over 15 years, testified 
that the stolen pipe was "still functional" and in good working order. (Tr., p.49, 
Ls.17-22; p.50, Ls.2-5.) The stolen pipe was old, "but if it's good still, you don't 
thrmv it av.:ay." (Tr., p.49, L.25 - p.50, L.1; p.62, Ls.2-8.) Mr. Staley testified 
that, if they hadn't been able to recover the stolen pipe and finish their work re-
installing the pump, Oakley Idaho Crops would have had to purchase new pipe 
to finish the job and be ready for the irrigation season. (Tr., p.52, L.22 - p.54, 
L.10.) 
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Mr. Staley testified that his company not only installs and repairs deep 
well turbine pumps, but also sells the equipment and materials, and, when it's 
available, buys and sells used materials. (Tr., p.41, L.8 - p.42, L.1.) 
Mr. Staley testified that new 10-foot tube and shaft sold for "somewhere 
around 530 some dollars a joint," or "more than $500 per 10-foot section." (Tr., 
p.51, Ls.16-22.) The two pieces of 10-inch column stolen would cost "a little over 
$600 a joint" if purchased new. (Tr., p.52, Ls.15-20.) Mr. Staley further testified 
that he buys used material for 40 percent of its new value, and then sells it for 60 
percent of its new value, "so if the new value was $500, used would be around 
$300." (Tr., p.51, L.23 - p.52, L.3; p.57, L.16- p.59, L.22.) 
To determine the market value of the stolen pipe in this case, the 
prosecutor asked Mr. Staley: 
Now, talking specifically about the material from this case, let's say 
Mr. Young had recovered it, but ... after he had already installed 
new material so it was then excess and he needed to sell it. 
Around that time, end of March 2010, would this material have 
gone for that used price you just gave us? 
(Tr., p.52, Ls.4-11.) When Mr. Staley answered in the affirmative, the prosecutor 
clarified, "so about $300 per 10-foot section?" (Tr., p.52, Ls.12-13.) Mr. Staley 
,.,,..,.,;,.. nMC"\At=r=rl in tho -:>ffirrn-:,tiw::> "rtlh::::it'c:: rnrrprf " (Tr n ~? I c:;. 11-14 ) Mr Gl~GIIII Clll~YY\..rl\..,U Ill I.II'--' '--4 ....... '--4\.IW-1 l'"J··-- .. - __ ,,_ ...... , , ... , •. ::__, -':..---~ ... , ----C 
Staley further testified that "the value of the stuff has stayed pretty steady for the 
past year and a half or so." (Tr., p.58, Ls.16-19.) 
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D. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which The Jury 
Reasonably Found That The Value Of The Stolen Pipe Possessed By 
Vargas Exceeded $1000 
1. The State Presented Substantial Evidence That Vargas Possessed All 
Of The Stolen Pipe Recovered From Santos Recycling 
Vargas first argues that there is no evidence that Vargas possessed all of 
the stolen pipe, claiming that the state proved only that Vargas delivered some 
unknown quantity of pipe on March 20. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The state 
presented substantial evidence to the jury that Vargas delivered both loads of the 
stolen pipe, establishing that the total fair market value of all of the stolen pipe 
could be attributed to his conduct. 
Sergeant Daniel Renz testified that he interviewed Vargas on March 23. 
(Tr., p.105, Ls.19-25.) Vargas told Sgt. Renz that he drove his truck, loaded with 
scrap, to Santos Recycling twice on the previous Saturday (Tr., p.111, Ls.16-19), 
and also twice drove his truck, again loaded with scrap, to Santos Recycling on 
the following Monday (Tr., p.114, L.20 - p.116, L.3). 
Mr. Santos testified that he personally observed Vargas deliver the stolen 
pipe in two separate loads, each on a different day. (Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.87, L.5; 
p.94, Ls.3-6; p.96, Ls.5-14.) Mr. Santos further testified that his recollection was 
that during one of the deliveries, Vargas was alone, and during the other delivery 
Vargas had someone with him. (Tr., p.86, Ls.7-24; p.93, L.22 - p.94, L.16.) 
When Vargas's counsel asked why Mr. Santos's records showed Vargas's 
signature only on March 20, Mr. Santos, referring to Vargas, explained: 
I don't know whose signature is the first or last day. I unloaded 
this man twice. One day I unloaded him with that kind of 
material. The second day he come in, I did the same thing, the 
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same material. That's all I'm willing to testify. I don't know who 
signed for the pipe, but it was him driving the vehicle. It was - I 
unloaded his pickup. I don't know whose signature is on here. I 
know that both of the days that we're talking about he was driving 
the vehicle. I just presume consequently he got paid for it. 
(Tr., p.96, Ls.4-14.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
Either of these statements alone provide the jury with substantial evidence 
upon which it could have found that the prosecution established that Vargas 
possessed all of the stolen pipe. Taken together, the testimony of Sgt. Renz and 
Mr. Santos make clear that substantial, competent evidence supports the jury's 
conclusion that Vargas possessed all of the stolen pipe. 
2. The State Presented Substantial Evidence That The Fair Market 
Value Of The Stolen Pipe Exceeded $1000 
A theft is a felony if the value of the property taken exceeds $1,000. I.C. § 
18-2407(1 )(b)(1 ). "Value" means "the market value of the property at the time 
and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of 
replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime." I.C. § 18-
2402(11)(a). Under the theft statutes, the state "must prove either that the 
market value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000 or it must prove a market 
value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained and may thereupon rely on the 
replacement cost as the value." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 263, 233 P.3d 
190, 194 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Mr. Staley testified, based on his 15-20 years experience in the business, 
that the fair market value for the stolen pipe around the time it was stolen was 
approximately 60 percent of the new value of each piece, or approximately $300 
for each 10-foot tube and shaft section and approximately $360 for each piece of 
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10-inch column. (Tr., p.40, L.23 - p.41, L.5; p.51, Ls.16 - p.52, L.20; p.57, L.16 
- p.59, L.22.) Nineteen pieces of the 10-foot tube and shaft and two pieces of 
10-inch column were stolen and sold by Vargas to Santos Recycling. (Tr., p.48, 
Ls.1-3.) Based on Mr. Staley's testimony, the state presented substantial 
evidence that established the fair market value of the stolen pipe at over six 
thousand dollars. 
Vargas claims the state "presented no evidence of the actual market value 
for used pipe 'of the same characteristics and quality' as the pipe which is the 
subject of this case." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The prosecutor, however, 
specifically asked Mr. Staley to evaluate the fair market value of the used pipe 
stolen in this case, and had him confirm that it would have sold, at the time of the 
theft, for 60 percent of its new value, the used value previously testified to by Mr. 
Staley. (Tr., p.52, Ls.4-14.) Mr. Staley was well aware of the "characteristics 
and quality" of the pipe stolen in this case; he attested that it was still good pipe 
and was, in fact, currently "functional, and it's back in the hole" serving the well it 
had been removed from. (Tr., p.49, L.17 - p.50, L.5; p.62, Ls.2-8.) 
As to Vargas's contention that no market value could be determined 
because there '.Nas no market for used pipe, "because there is not any pipe 
available" (Appellant's Brief, p.12), common sense and Mr. Staley's testimony 
contradict his claim. 1 
1 Vargas's claim is that the state's evidence established that no fair market value 
could be satisfactorily ascertained (because there was no market for used pipe). 
According to I.C. § 18-2402(11 )(a) and Johnson, the state could then establish 
the value of the stolen pipe using its replacement value. The replacement value 
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Mr. Staley testified that it would have been difficult to find used material to 
replace the stolen pipe, because "that particular size is more difficult [to find] 
because usually people upgrade to that size." (Tr., p.53, Ls.5-6.) (Emphasis 
supplied.) While Mr. Staley had new 10-foot pieces of pipe "sitting in my yard," 
the used ones are harder to find because "most everybody that has it is using 
it. .. . It's not stuff that's sitting around in yards everywhere not being used." 
(Tr., p.56, Ls.7-24.) (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Staley further testified that 
"customers all the time ask me if there's any used stuff, if I have any used stuff 
available" (Tr., p.60, Ls.2-5), and that he had a customer ask him just the day 
prior to his testimony if he had any to sell (Tr., p.61, Ls.18-19). Unfortunately, 
despite the clear demand for used pipe, "I don't have it to sell is the problem. If I 
have the stuff, I could sell it more often. It's just not available." (Tr., p.61, Ls.18-
21.) 
Mr. Staley's testimony clearly established a market for the used pipe 
stolen in this case, and his testimony as to fair market value provided the jury 
with substantial evidence upon which to base its conclusion that the value of the 
stolen pipe exceeded $1,000. 
of the stolen pipes, according to Mr. Staley's testimony, exceeded $1,000. In 
fact, Mr. Staley's testimony established the replacement value of the pipes at 
over$10,000. (Tr., p.51, L.12-p.52, L.21.) 
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11. 
Vargas Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Refused To 
Use His Proposed Jury Instruction On Salvage Value 
A. Introduction 
Vargas claims the district court committed reversible error when it refused 
to instruct the jury using his proposed instruction on salvage value. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.14-16.) Vargas's claim is without merit, because his proposed 
instruction was not applicable to the jury's determination of the value of the 
stolen pipe. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because the propriety of a jury instruction is a question of law, the Court 
exercises free review on appeal. State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 414, 49 P.3d 
1260, 1264 (Ct. App. 2002). For the failure to give a jury instruction to be 
reversible error on appeal, the instructions as given must mislead the jury or 
prejudice the defendant. State v. Edney, 145 Idaho 694, 697, 183 P.3d 782, 785 
(Ct. App. 2008). 
C. The District Court Properly Refused To Use Vargas's Proposed Jury 
Instruction 
A requested jury instruction must be given if: (1) it properly states the 
governing law; (2) a reasonable view of at least some evidence would support 
the defendant's legai theory; (3) the subject of the requested instruction is not 
addressed adequately by other jury instructions; and (4) the requested 
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instruction does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the evidence. 
State v. Edney, 145 Idaho 694, 697, 183 P.3d 782, 785 (Ct. App. 2008). 
Because Vargas's proposed jury instruction did not properly state the 
governing law, and because the elements of grand theft by possession of stolen 
property were adequately addressed by the other jury instructions, Vargas has 
failed to show that the district court committed reversible error. 
Vargas requested that the jury be instructed that it could determine the 
value of the stolen pipe using its salvage value. (R., pp.72-78; Tr., p.23, L.24 -
p.24, L.6; p.82, L.15 - p.83, L.5.) The district court correctly instructed the jury 
as to the elements of theft by possession of stolen property, according to ICJI 
547. (R., pp.139-140.) The district court also instructed the jury regarding the 
definition of the term value, according to ICJI 575. (R., p.144.) On the second 
day of trial, the district court rejected the proposed instruction, finding that the 
state had met its burden to present evidence of fair market value. (Tr., p.83, 
Ls.17-23.) 
Vargas claims the district court erred when it rejected his proposed jury 
instruction, relying on language in State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 263, 233 
P.3d 190, 194 (Ct. ,6.pp. 2010), a!!rnNing that other measurements of value; 
including salvage value, may be used. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The court in 
Johnson went on to say, however, that such alternative measurements of value 
may only be used "if market value cannot be established." Johnson, 149 Idaho 
at 263, 233 P .3d at 194. Vargas's argument, therefore, depends on a showing 
that market value cannot be established. Where, as here, market value and 
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replacement value have both been established by the state, there is no 
requirement that the court instruct the jury as to salvage value, 2 and Johnson 
does not demand otherwise. Vargas has failed to establish the district court 
erred when it rejected his proposed jury instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction 
entered upon the jury verdict finding Vargas guilty of grand theft by possession of 
stolen property. 
2 This is particularly true where, as here, the stolen property has been firmly 
established as still useable for its intended purpose and is not "useless for 
anything other than scrap," unlike the chopped wire sold for scrap in Johnson. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho at 263, 233 P.3d at 194. 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of September, 2011, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
BRIAN M. TANNER 
Tanner Law, PLLC 
137 Gooding Street West 
Twin Falls, ID 83301 
RAC/pm 
14 
